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HEADNOTE
Over the past decade, widespread interest has developed among 
consumers in the formation of cooperatives, raising the question of how 
economically viable these cooperatives will be over time. This 
analysis shows that the potential for growth of consumer cooperatives 
will depend on the success of cooperatives in adopting certain structural 
changes, including a capital stock form of organization, increasing 
management efficiency, the use of borrowed capital, federation and cons­
olidation. These conclusions are derived from analysis of the cost 
functions of the cooperative firm, and from comparative analysis of the 
structural evolution of producer marketing cooperatives and consumer 
cooperatives.
THE POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH OF CONSUMER COOPERATIVES -
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The cooperative movement, which has experienced in the past century 
turbulent cycles of growth and decline, has inspired equally cyclical, 
yet intense interest on the part of social critics and researchers from 
a variety of disciplines. The flexibility and fluidity of the coopera­
tive form of organization has limited the ability of social scientists, 
particularly economists, to focus rigorous analytical tools on the 
cooperative experience: exceptions are well established institutional
structures such as the Yugoslavian firm [25] and the agricultural market­
ing cooperatives of the U.S. [15], However, the resurgence of consumer 
cooperatives in the 1970's and academic interest in them [1] has created 
a need for economic analysis of the consumer cooperative. This paper 
outlines the characteristics of and the structural problems faced by the 
newly emerging consumer cooperatives in the U.S. Potential for growth in 
the face of these structural problems is analyzed using tools of economic 
analysis and comparison with producer cooperatives, in terms of motivation 
for structural change and consequences of such change for growth.
Current statistics on the newly emerging consumer food cooperatives 
show that about 3.5 million individuals belong to cooperative buying clubs 
and storefronts in the U.S,, with projected annual sales for these 
cooperatives of approximately $400 million. Although there is consider­
able variety in the types of activities consumer cooperatives have under­
taken, the major thrust of the movement has been toward food cooperatives,
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upon which the following discussion will focus.
In addition to the consumer cooperatives which have been formed 
over the past decade, there are about a dozen older cooperatives which 
have survived from an earlier period of consumer cooperative formation 
in the 1920rs and 1930's. Since growth of these older cooperatives has 
been static for some time, this discussion will concentrate on the newly 
emerging cooperatives.^ Initially highly variable in structure, viability 
and objectives, these new cooperatives are showing signs of stabilizing 
as a movement, although the failure rate of individual organizations 
remains very high. While not yet mature as an institution, certain 
characteristic types of organizations and methods of operation now dom­
inate the newly emerging cooperatives.
I. Characteristics of Newly Emerging Cooperatives
To analyze the structure of the newly emerging consumer cooperatives, 
it is necessary to provide some background and identify the character­
istics that distinguish them from older cooperatives. Though both new 
and old cooperatives adhere generally to the principles of cooperation 
established by the Rochdale Pioneers early in the 19th century, the new 
cooperatives interpret those principles loosely; in some cases they 
deviate substantially. Perhaps the most significant distinction is with 
respect to the principle that sales of consumer goods should be at 
market prices, with dividends paid in proportion to purchases. Most 
post-1965 cooperatives have chosen to sell below market price and provide 
direct savings to their members, with surcharges added to wholesale cost 
of the product to provide for operating costs of the cooperatives. Thus 
one of the principles which seems to have emerged is that the cooperatives
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should not only be non-profit in an accounting sense over the long run, 
but should also avoid generating an operating surplus from sales in the 
short run. Funds for expansion and capital improvement must come from 
grants, loans, contributions, or increases in the surcharge agreed upon 
by members for specific purposes.
It is significant to note that most of the older traditional coop­
eratives are survivors of a movement that began in the 1920’s and 1930’s, 
a period of generally stable or falling prices. The new cooperatives, 
by contrast, were formed in the period since 1969, when prices were 
rising. This may be a partial explanation of their choice of the direct 
savings rather than rebate method of operations. The rebate cooperative 
holds surpluses generated by its operations for as long as a year before 
returning the surplus to members via patronage refunds. This was seen 
as a major virtue of the cooperative by the Rochdale Pioneers, for whom 
the cooperative was a vehicle for helping its low-income members 
accumulate savings.
In times of rapid inflation, however, a cooperative which operates 
as a net debtor to its members has little attraction. To the extent that 
the cooperative uses that surplus to internally finance capital improve­
ments, the cooperative itself is also hurt by inflation— the probability 
that the buying power of the surplus will be eaten up by inflation before 
it can be used to finance long run cost decreasing improvements is also 
increased. The direct savings cooperative, by contrast, tries to main­
tain a balanced account with its membership at all times, and the members 
can derive immediate benefits via the direct savings. They do not become 
net creditors to the cooperative, and therefore, do not incur additional
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costs as a result of inflation. A further advantage of the direct savings 
model is that the savings do not constitute income and, therefore, are 
not taxed; with the rebate cooperative the dividends would be taxable.
This characteristic of direct savings has a corollary in the formal 
organization of the newly emerging cooperatives that distinguishes them 
from older cooperatives. Most older cooperatives are incorporated as 
stock cooperatives, where the members invest money and shares are issued 
to them. Most newly emerging cooperatives, if they are incorporated at 
all, are organized as membership cooperatives. Persons or households 
wishing to participate pay a membership fee annually or upon joining, 
and no stock is issued [7].
A third distinguishing characteristic from the older cooperatives is 
the reluctance of newly emerging cooperatives to rely heavily on paid 
staff and management. As they expand it often becomes necessary to hire 
staff, but as a matter of principle, these organizations generally prefer 
to use volunteer membership labor if possible. Where volunteer labor is 
insufficient, they often have chosen to employ a staff composed of a paid 
'’collective" of the membership. The collective makes decisions and 
performs the basic operations of the cooperative with assistance from 
volunteers.
The tax system creates additional incentives to organize cooperatives 
that rely on volunteer labor rather than paid staff. By utilizing volun­
teers, the cooperative remains outside the tax system as part of the 
informal or "barter" economy. The employer pays no payroll taxes, and 
the employee pays no income tax. The benefits of participation in the 
cooperative can make volunteer labor in exchange for savings on food
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budgets an attractive moonlighting occupation, when compared to altern­
ative after tax income opportunities. Even where paid staff is employed, 
some cooperatives attempt to retain these tax benefits by employing them 
as "consultants", or some similar ploy, to evade payroll taxes. Since 
many cooperatives are incorporated as non-profit organizations, they may 
enjoy tax advantages in any case.
The characteristics of reliance on volunteer labor, membership 
capital and direct savings to members contribute to the fundamental prob­
lem facing the cooperative in the long run— the inability of small coop­
eratives to grow. The way in which these characteristics limit the newly 
emerged cooperative's growth is illustrated below with analysis of the 
cooperative as a firm.
With few exceptions, the newer cooperatives are too small to realize 
the economies of scale of a large supermarket. While the cohesion of 
cooperative membership requires contact and communication, the economics 
of the retail food industry in which the food cooperative operates requires 
control of large organizations, with centralized decision-making, to avoid 
being squeezed by almost equally powerful wholesaler groups and food 
manufacturers. The survival of the consumer cooperative is threatened 
until it grows enough to gain a competitive position in the food market­
ing system. It may, of course, be the case that many small cooperatives 
prefer to remain small in order to preserve the positive social benefits 
of group interaction. This paper is addressed primarily to that segment 
of the consumer cooperative movement that is seeking to grow in order
to become more economically viable.
As a firm, the cooperative buys and markets consumer goods, incurring
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costs and generating revenues. Its objective is to equate output price 
to average costs of production. Anderson, Foster and Maurice [1] have 
shown that if membership size is a decision variable, the cooperative 
will operate at the point where demand is forced through the point of 
minimum average cost. In reality, not only membership but the structural 
form of the cooperative becomes a decision variable, as the cooperative 
must determine how much physical plant to acquire and whether or not to 
rely exclusively on volunteer labor. The cost function of the cooperative 
is determined by these decis ions, and analysis of the cost functions of 
cooperative firms illustrates why small cooperatives and buying clubs 
experience difficulty in expanding to realize economies of scale.
Figure 1 shows how the average costs of the individual cooperative 
firm vary, as a function of total sales. The short run average cost 
curves of a participatory cooperative which uses volunteer labor are drawn 
as SRACX and SRAC2, where SRAC1 represents the cost function of a small 
cooperative or buying club which has minimal fixed assets and overhead, 
distributing food as soon as it is purchased out of a free distribution 
point such as a member’s home. SRAC^ describes the cost function of a 
larger cooperative which continues to rely primarily on volunteer labor 
but has acquired fixed assets such as a storefront for distribution, some 
storage and transportation capacity in order to handle a larger volume, 
and possibly a paid part-time manager or coordinator to reduce losses. 
Point A represents the volume of sales handled by a small buying club 
with only 10 or 15 households participating. If it expands in membership 
to handle a volume of sales equivalent to B, it can reduce the costs per 
unit purchased (from to Cg) by taking advantage of discounts on larger
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lots, as well as better prices from more distant sources of supply.
Beyond point B, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate 
activities within the cooperative, costs begin to rise because of losses 
due to inadequate storage, missed work shifts, and pilferage. In order 
to handle this larger volume, at a volume of sal® equivalent to C it 
becomes more efficient to acquire distribution space, and transportation 
capacity so the cooperative can expand to point D, where costs decline 
along SRAC2  reaching a minimum at C^. Beyond this point, costs again 
begin to rise because management problems associated with increased vol­
ume and membership create operational inefficiency and losses.
Observation indicates that the maximum manageable size for a cooper­
ative relying primarily on volunteer labor is approximately 800-1,000
2member households. To move from volunteer labor to hired labor, however,
means that fixed costs increase dramatically, shifting average costs from
SRAC2  to SRAC^. In order to reduce costs to a level which will allow
food to be purchased by members at prices below competitive market prices,
the coop must achieve substantial economies of size by increasing its
volume of sales to a point at least equivalent to that of a small to
medium size supermarket. There is a substantial gap between the volume
of sales generated by 1,000 regular cooperative participants and the
3volume of sales generated by the smallest supermarkets. Consequently,
there is no smooth expansion path along which a volunteer staffed cooper­
ative can expand into a store type cooperative operated by hired labor.
The alternative of beginning with a large store operation, however, 
has proved to be risky because such an operation has difficulty in
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forming the nucleus of committed and dedicated membership which is required 
for success. Many such attempts at "top-down" organizing, especially in 
connection with urban poverty programs, have been attempted without much 
success.
II. Perspectives on Cooperative Growth
Can the newly emerging consumer cooperatives evolve different organ­
izational structures to expand and grow to become a viable alternative 
in the food marketing system? Perspective on their potential for growth, 
through structural evolution and change, may be obtained by comparison 
with the evolution and growth of successful forms of cooperatives in 
agriculture, particularly producer marketing cooperatives. Cooperative 
action by agricultural producers is generally thought to have been very 
successful in attaining for producers a more favorable bargaining position 
in the food system. Although the cases are not strictly identical 
because farmers are seeking to raise the prices of the foods they sell, 
while consumers are attempting, through cooperative action, to reduce 
the prices of the foods they purchase, there are many parallels that can 
be drawn. Both types of cooperation are in response to unfavorable 
market conditions - in the case of producer cooperatives, low producer 
returns, and in the case of consumer cooperatives, high consumer prices. 
Both types attempt to gain a more favorable bargaining position in the 
marketplace for their members.
Many of the structural limitations and organizational problems dis­
cussed above which confront the newly emerging consumer cooperatives 
correspond to those confronted in the early phases of producer cooperative 
marketing associations. By examining the economic, structural and
-9-
institutional conditions influencing the periods of growth of the agri­
cultural marketing cooperatives, we may project the growth potential for 
the reemergence of consumer co-ops. We focus specifically on dairy and 
fruit and vegetable producer marketing cooperatives because the two 
together constitute the largest number of marketing cooperatives, classi­
fied by product type: of the 1,674 marketing cooperatives functioning
in 1976, 43% of the total number of cooperatives marketed either fruits 
and vegetables or dairy products [14].
Historical Development of Producer Marketing Cooperatives
There were three major periods of growth and structural change for 
the agricultural marketing cooperatives. The first period of initial 
formation and growth, 1810-1920, was marked by periods of low producer 
returns that stimulated organization of cooperatives. By 1867, during 
which time period milk prices were very low, there were more than 400 
dairy cooperatives in the U.S. [23, p.2]. In that year too, the first 
cooperative fruit marketing organization (Fruit Growers Union) was for­
med. The fruit and vegetable marketing cooperatives which followed were 
organized to sell cranberries, grapes, apples and citrus, ranging in 
membership from as few as 180 to as many as 2,000. By 1915 there were 
871 fruit and vegetable marketing organizations with a membership of 
110,000. [13].
However, many of these early fruit and vegetable cooperatives failed 
or were reorganized at least once in the period prior to 1920. These 
early cooperatives were organized primarily on a capital stock basis,
with all savings returned to shareholders in proportion to their owner­
ship of stock. As stock became more concentrated in the hands of a few
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individuals, who were more profit oriented than oriented towards the 
maintenance of the organization, the support of growers started to de­
cline. Another reason for failure was bitter opposition to the cooper­
atives from powerful shippers, making it difficult to obtain price 
advantages in the market [17, p.274].
Dairy cooperatives also experienced difficulty, and for similar 
reasons; the dairy cooperatives were not very successful in achieving 
price increases for their members. Because of the power of dealers over 
the collection and distribution of milk, the cooperatives did not have 
enough clout to successfully withhold milk for higher prices [5, p.3]. 
This was the problem experienced by the Milk Producers Association of 
Boston and New Hampshire, a cooperative with 874 members in 1867. The 
Association had little success in bargaining until it merged with the 
Boston Cooperative Milk Producers Company in 1899 [5], Also to attain 
sufficient bargaining clout, in 1907, the Dairymen's League was formed 
by producers supplying the New York Metropolitan market. By 1917, the 
organization had 13,000 memberships and sponsored a successful milk strike 
for price increases [21, p. 6,7],
The second phase of cooperative action, 1920-45, was marked by 
increasing legislative and regulatory activity. The Capper-Volstead Act 
(1922) legalized formation of marketing cooperatives and was followed 
by a series of legislation that strengthened and supported growth and 
development of cooperatives [2, 3], In 1926, the Cooperative Marketing 
Act established the Division of Cooperative Marketing within the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Later in 1928, the Agricultural 
Marketing Act established the Federal Farm Board, with $500 million for
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loans and assistance to develop a strong comprehensive system of cooper­
ative marketing organizations. In 1933, the Farm Credit Act transferred 
the duties of the Farm Board to the Farm Credit Administration. An 
additional provision to the Credit Act was the establishment of 13 
regionally located Banks for Cooperatives.
The initial effect on dairy cooperatives of this government invol­
vement was a phenomenal amount of growth and development. Many new 
organizations came into being and some of the existing cooperatives as 
well were reorganized and strengthened with funds from the Banks for 
Cooperatives. Many bargaining cooperatives expanded the scale of their 
operations to include processing and distribution [18]. In 1936, 
there were 2,338 dairy cooperatives, providing a variety of services and 
products: 114 of these were bargaining associations with an average
membership of 1,176; 239 were operating associations, with an average 
membership of 426; and there were 1,385 cooperative creameries and 538 
cooperative cheese factories [21, p, 24].
One cooperative association that was a product of this period is 
the Land 0TLakes Creameries, Inc. of Minneapolis. Formed in 1922, as a 
federation of local cooperative creameries united for the collective 
merchandizing of butter, this organization grew to include 495 member 
associations by 1929. In later years, the organization expanded its 
activities to include manufacture and processing of cheese, eggs, and 
poultry [12, p. 26 and 27]. By 1936, 48% of the fluid milk, 39% of the 
butter and 29,4% of the cheese produced was being marketed through dairy 
cooperatives [21, p. 25].
Fruit and vegetable cooperatives continued to show a high rate of
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mortality in the early part of the period. Data compiled in 1932 indi­
cated that 52% of the 3,046 associations for which records were available 
were nonfunctioning and that 68% of those cooperatives had operated only 
for one to five years [11]. But, the development of the legal framework 
for cooperatives and government financial support in the 1930's, espec­
ially the establishment of the Federal Farm Board and the Farm Credit 
Act of 1933, did facilitate the continuing development of large scale 
fruit and vegetable cooperatives [16]. Out of 916 cooperatives marketing 
fruits and vegetables in 1944/45, at least 20 were very large scale 
organizations, each with an annual business of half a million dollars a 
year [4]. Further, the development and large scale growth of cooperative 
marketing associations in the Florida and California citrus industries were 
promulgated by a series of Marketing Agreements in each state which 
provided a framework within which grower and shipper interests could be 
coordinated.
The third, postwar, period in cooperative marketing was one of 
federation, consolidation and growth of large scale organizations. While 
the absolute number of cooperatives declined throughout the 1950's and 
early 1960's (the number of dairy cooperatives declined by an average of 
7% per year, and the number of fruit and vegetable cooperatives decreased 
from 825 to 654 over that period [20, p. 45]), the remaining cooperatives' 
scales of operation expanded to handle greatly increased volumes. Values 
of sales by cooperatives more than doubled [4, p. 133].
The major stimulants to these changes were the rise of supermarkets, 
wholesaler concentration and changing technologies in handling and 
processing [6], The response of dairy cooperatives to this changing
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market situation was the formation of federationss within which each 
cooperative maintained its status as a separate corporation, but whose 
activities were coordinated to more effectively bargain with handlers 
for higher milk prices [19]. Although two large federations had formed 
prior to 1960 - the Dairy Products Marketing Association and the National 
Milk Producers' Federation with 100 member cooperatives - during the 
1960's, eight additional federations were formed, each of which had any­
where from five to twenty cooperatives and 500 to 53,000 producers [19].
The trend toward regional consolidation of fruit and vegetable 
cooperatives accelerated considerably in this postwar period. In 1951/ 
52, the regional marketing associations handled 35% of total cooper­
ative fruit and vegetable volume. By 1963/64, that figure had risen to 
43.9% and by 1971/72, to 66.6% [24]. In addition, fruit and vegetable 
marketing cooperatives acquired large scale processing, freezing and 
canning units, developed bargaining cooperatives on a large scale 
(by 1965 there were about 40 of these cooperatives), and set up associa­
tions (e.g. the American Agricultural Marketing Association) to assist 
growers in their bargaining activities [4, p. 152].
III. Possibilities and Potentials for Consumer Cooperative Growth
There are a number of parallels that can be drawn between producer 
cooperative growth and the reemergence of the consumer cooperative move­
ment. The external economic environment, in the form of food price 
inflation, is presently providing the stimulus to the consumer cooper­
ative movement in the same way as depressed food prices stimulated form­
ation of the marketing cooperatives in the period prior to 1920. Both 
types of cooperatives attempt to function independently of the non­
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cooperative sector in terms of pricing behavior. In the case of market­
ing cooperatives, producers attempt to obtain higher-than market prices. 
In the case of consumer cooperatives, the cooperative sells below 
market price whenever possible.
To countervail the increasing power of the supermarkets and large 
wholesalers in the post-war era, producer marketing cooperatives found 
it necessary to federate over a fairly large geographical range. As 
large retail food chains became large purchasers of the cooperatives' 
products, often cooperatives in different regions found themselves in 
price competition for the business of the same distributor. Growth 
and consolidation among milk dealers and distributors changed the type 
of wholesale customer with whom the dairy marketing cooperatives did 
business, calling for countervailing cooperative bargaining strength 
through federation. Interaction among cooperatives in federation activ­
ities led to the realization that yet more fully coordinated cooperative 
activity would Increase bargaining power and operational efficiency and 
control [19] and this led to the merging of interregional cooperatives 
into multimarket associations.
Vertical integration was another solution developed by fruit and 
vegetable marketing cooperatives to the increasing size of supermarkets 
and of other wholesaler purchasers. The terminal market, for example 
has been largely reduced in importance as a result of direct contracting 
of the cooperatives with major purchasers.
Similarly, if the newly emerging consumer cooperatives are to 
develop into a real alternative to the present food retail system,
ize as well as in numbers. Theconsumer cooperatives must grow in s
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growth of supermarkets and increasing concentration in the retail food 
industry is acting as a stimulus to alternatives like consumer cooper­
atives [8], but if consumer cooperatives are to compete effectively* 
they need to achieve equivalent bargaining strength in competing for 
supplies and markets.
The newly emerged consumer cooperatives have already sought a 
variety of organizational forms and methods of operation in efforts to 
expand. One variation is between the store cooperative and the cooper­
ative that operates as a "preorder" or buying club, which may not even 
have a fixed distribution point. Preorders are designed to be a smaller 
unit than stores, falling somewhere between the household and the super­
market in scale. But through the device of organizing into "blocks" or 
"branches", preorders in some cases have grown quite large [9]. These 
block preorders handle the duties of purchasing and distribution on a 
rotation basis, with each block taking its turn as the "masterblock" for 
some specified period. The branch cooperative has a volunteer central 
committee that purchases and distributes food for the entire cooperative, 
and does not rotate.
As an alternative to expanding as a retail operation, consumer 
cooperatives have also sought integration through the supply system. 
Vertical integration is an attempt to shift the cost curve downward by 
eliminating the marketing margins between the farmer and the retailer.
As a strategy it has sound economic rationale, because gross wholesale- 
retail marketing margins are only about 20% of sales [10], most of which 
cannot be eliminated. The farmer's share of the food dollar, however,
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is a relatively small component of food cost and elimination of the 
farm-wholesale margin substantially decreases costs to the cooperative.
Most of the new cooperatives have a strong interest, not only for 
economic but ideological reasons, in eliminating the middleman’s share. 
Direct marketing of produce, grains and sometimes meats, or at a minimum, 
purchasing from terminal markets are fundamentals of most cooperative 
operations. To carry a full line of products, however, including those 
processed goods for which the farm wholesale-retail margin is highest, 
requires a degree of vertical integration that most new cooperatives have 
not achieved, although some have begun to explore linkages with older 
consumer cooperatives which have developed that capacity.
Another device which has been employed with some success by both 
preorders and store cooperatives to overcome diseconomies of small size, 
is federation with similar organizations to fulfill shared needs. In 
its simplest form, a group of cooperatives can informally meet for 
political and educational purposes. At greater levels of complexity, 
cooperatives can form a federation which will handle ordering, buying, 
shipping and warehousing, and even processing (particularly milling and 
baking). In some cases, large cooperatives and/or federations have taken 
up farming in order to internalize the primary source of supply. But 
these are rare and for the most part, federation has not been very 
successful because of the difficulty of coordinating many small, volun­
teer staffed organizations.
Thus although expansion has been attempted both through federation 
and vertical integration, there may be more basic structural changes within 
cooperatives that are required as pre-conditions for growth and consoli-
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datlon. Based on the early experiences of the producer marketing cooper­
atives which were formed on a non-stock basis (like the California Fruit 
Exchange, which had to be reorganized from a nonstock to a capital stock 
basis in 1907 because of heavy indebtedness), the newly emerging cooper­
atives may need to turn to the capital stock form of ownership to solve 
the capital formation problems encountered in the growth process. The 
instincts of the newly emerging consumer cooperatives in attempting to 
maintain broad membership participation by relying on a non-stock form 
of organization, are understandable; the early experience of the fruit 
and vegetable marketing cooperatives organized before 1920, that relied 
on capital stock, shows that they lost membership support and failed when 
ownership of stock became concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. 
But the solution to this problem, as developed by the producer marketing 
cooperatives, was to retain the capital stock form of organization and to 
limit the number of shares held by any individual.
The role of government intervention through legislative acts (like 
those passed during the 1930's), and through the establishment of a 
cooperatives' credit system cannot be ignored as an important factor 
influencing the growth and expansion of the producer marketing cooper­
atives. The government—sponsored Banks for Cooperatives directly influ­
enced the evolution of the financial structure, as well as the manage­
ment of these marketing cooperatives.
Influence of the Banks for Cooperatives in the operation and manage­
ment of cooperatives has increased over time, as borrowed capital from 
this source, as a percentage of cooperatives' assets has increased. In 
1976, 73% of the capital borrowed by marketing cooperatives was from the
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Banks for Cooperatives.
Over time, marketing cooperatives have relied increasingly on 
borrowed capital from all sources and less on equity capital. For 
producer cooperatives in general, equity capital decreased from 54% of 
total assets in 1954 to 41.7% in 1976, whereas borrowed capital increased 
over that time period from 24.5% to 33.1% of total assets [14]. The 
increase in borrowed capital has undoubtedly given banks a greater 
influence on cooperative management. For example, in the case of the 
Florida Citrus Mutual in 1949, growers, shippers and canners were faced 
with an ultimatum from influential banks to produce a workable coordin­
ated marketing plan if adequate financial backing and further credit were 
to be granted [6, p. 50].
With the formation of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank (NCCB), 
which is patterned after the Banks for Cooperatives and which has over 
$100 million to lend in its initial three years, increasing reliance of 
consumer cooperatives on borrowed capital from this source can be 
expected. As consumer cooperatives come to rely on borrowed capital, 
increased involvement of lending institutions in the management of the 
cooperatives can be expected as well. Already the NCCB has stipulated 
operational changes as a condition for financing of one long established 
consumer cooperative in New York State which has experienced financial 
difficulties. As borrowed capital increases as a percentage of assets 
in the more recently formed consumer cooperatives, the use of volunteer 
labor and loosely structured management systems is likely to decrease, 
as the lending institutions come to demand more efficiency and account­
ability. The medium to long-term impacts of the NCCB on the.structure
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of consumer cooperatives and on consumer cooperative growth is, of course, 
yet to be seen, but given the amount of money this Bank has to lend, are 
likely to be substantial.
IV. Conclusion
The major conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are that the 
recently formed consumer cooperatives must grow if they are to become 
economically viable in the present food marketing system and that, to 
do so, certain structural changes must occur. The needed structural 
changes can be identified by comparing the evolution of producer market­
ing cooperatives with the dominant characteristics of consumer cooper­
atives today. They consist of adopting a capital stock form of organiz­
ation, decreasing the use of volunteer labor and increasing the effici­
ency of management, increasing the reliance on borrowed capital, which 
has been made available as a catalyst to growth by government sponsored 
financial institutions, and federation and consolidation in the recently 
formed consumer cooperatives.
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FOOTNOTES
Examples of the older type of consumer cooperatives include the 
Berkeley, California, Consumers’ Cooperative Society, and the 
Washington, D.C., Green Belt Consumers’ Cooperative. Centers of 
activity for the newer cooperatives are Minneapolis, Boston, 
Chicago, Austin, and Northern California.
For example, two well established volunteer staffed cooperatives 
in the Northeast (the Ithaca, New York, Real Food Cooperative 
and the Park Slope Cooperative in New York City), after a decade 
of operation, have reached about this size and it is unlikely 
that they can grow beyond this point; coordinating work activities 
in a cooperative manner becomes unmanageable.
For an 8,000-10,000 square foot supermarket, the smallest size 
store that would carry a full line of foods including meats, a 
customer count of at least 6,000 per week is needed for survival.
